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ISP LIABILITY AND SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS:
IMPLICATIONS OF EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LAW
FOR THE APPROACH SET OUT
IN VIACOM V. YOUTUBE
Jennifer L. Hanley*

Around the globe, YouTube has become a metaphor for the democratizing
power of the Internet and information. YouTube gives unknown performers, filmmakers, and artists new ways to promote their work to a global
audience and rise to worldwide fame; makes it possible for political candidates and elected officials to interact with the public in new ways; enables
first-hand reporting from war zones and from inside repressive regimes;
and lets students of all ages and backgrounds audit classes at leading
universities. I
If asked, a substantial number of Internet users would enthusiastically agree with the
above description of one of the most influential and celebrated contributions to the development of "Web 2.0,''2 and to the world at large. YouTube, along with similar Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs") 3 like Facebook and Twitter, has enabled Internet users to communicate
effortlessly and instantly with other people around the world.
Yet, the rise in popularity of these ISPs has been accompanied by an influx of litigation brought by those seeking stronger measures for enforcing intellectual property rights
("IPR").4 As a result, a contentious debate has begun regarding the proper role for ISPs in the
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Maurice A Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. Many thanks go to the
managing staff of the Journal of InternationalBusiness & Law for giving me this opportunity. Thank you as
well to Professor Lea Shaver, for supervising this Note. I am forever indebted to my family; thank you for all
of your faith and support. I wish to dedicate this Note to my fianc6 Anthony J.Ferraro, who continues to be my
"#1 Fan" in everything that I do.
1 Zahavah Levine, Broadcast Yourself, BROADCASTING OURSELVES ; ) THE OFFCiAL YouTUBE BLoG (Mar. 18,
2010), http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/V2010/03/broadcast-yourself.html.
2 Web 2.0 has been described as the "newest generation of Internet development, provid[ing] the technology
that facilitates [user] participation: wikis, podcasting, news fora, social networking sites, hosting services, and
search engines." Jessica Wood, The Darknet: A Digital Copyright Revolution, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, * 3
(2010), (citing Claudia K. Grinnell, From Consumer to Prosumer to Produser: Who Keeps Shifting My
Paradigm?(We Do!), 21 PuB. CULTURE 577, 595 (2009)).

3 This note defines an ISP as a "provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities
therefor." Carolyn Andrepont, Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Copyright Protectionsfor the Digital Age, 9
DEPAUL-LCA J.ART & ENT. L. POL'y 397, 413 (1999)(quoting Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"),
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 §512 (1998)). When Congress enacted the DMCA, which is the domestic
legislation currently governing ISP liability, it intended the legislation to cover ISPs that solely provided access

to the Internet. However, subsequent to the enactment of the DMCA, courts have broadened the definition of
ISP under the statute to include organizations that offer many different types of Internet "services," including
those offered by YouTube, FaceBook, et. al. See Neil A. Benchell, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A
Review of the Law and the Court's Interpretation,2 BUFF. INTELL. PRO. L.J. 30, 43 (2003).
4 Tanya Woods, Copyright Enforcement at All Costs? Considerationsfor Striking Balance in the International

Enforcement Agenda, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 347, 349-350 (2009).
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fight against online copyright infringement. 5 In Viacom v. YouTube, 6 a U.S. federal district
court held that under American copyright law, an ISP's legal obligation with respect to combating infringement is limited to removing infringing posts through an established "Notice and
Take-Down" 7 regime. 8 Nonetheless, developments in international law suggest a trend in
increased IPR enforcement that could threaten to undermine the balance struck by the Viacom
court by placing higher obligations on ISPs to police against copyright infringement.
After providing background on the legal framework that enabled the Viacom court to
reach its decision, this Note will predict the success of the court's approach in light of implications of evolving law regarding the role of ISPs in domestic and international copyright
enforcement regimes. This Note will focus primarily on the Viacom case to demonstrate that
the court's approach to the issue of ISP liability in that case translates into a balanced and
effective copyright regime. Furthermore, despite some indications that the approach would be
challenged by developments in domestic and international law, the thesis of this Note is that
the Viacom court's approach will ultimately prevail.
Part I will explain the background of domestic and international digital copyright
law. Part II will delve into the contrasting points of view regarding the "Viacom approach." 9
In Part 11, this Note will demonstrate that the Viacom approach is indeed the most practical in
terms of balancing increased enforcement of IPR with providing ISPs with the security and
flexibility to continue expanding.
I.

BACKGROUND ON CURRENT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT LAW
Background in American Copyright Law

It would be impossible to discuss a recent U.S. federal court decision without first
introducing and explaining the rule of law that guided the court's decision. American copyright law provides a copyright owner, for some duration of time, 10 with five exclusive "fundamental rights:" reproduction, adaption, publication, performance, and display." 1 Those who
infringe upon the owner's exclusive rights are subject to injunctive relief, damages, and, in
some cases, costs and attorneys fees.1 2 Copyright automatically "inheres" in a work the mo5 See Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement: A NonNeutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375 (2009).
6 718 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

7 "Notice and take-down," for the purposes of this Note, refers to current U.S. copyright law's requirement that
an ISP not have "actual knowledge" of infringing material posted, nor be "aware of facts and circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent." Once an ISP becomes aware of infringement, it can be held
secondarily liable for the infringement unless it "disables access to or removes [infringing] material
expeditiously." See IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW: TREATISE WITH FORMS § 4.12[6][C], at
4-358 (2d ed. 2011).
8 See Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
9 The "Viacom Approach" will be used interchangeably to mean a "Notice and Takedown Regime."
10 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT

LITIGATION INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION, DEFAMATION, PRIVACY 240-45 (3d ed. 1985).
'" H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
12 Max Stul Oppenheimer, The Time and Placefor "Technology Shifting" Rights, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 269, 293 (2010).
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ment it is "created,"' 13 but before any infringement case may move forward in a federal court,
14
the rights owner must have first registered the work with the federal Copyright Office.
Enforcing copyright protection grants a limited monopoly to the musicians, writers,
and owners of creative works. 15 Historically, the government has therefore sought to craft
balanced copyright enforcement legislation that would encourage the creation and innovation
6
of new materials and also incentivize the distribution of these new materials to the public.'
In an effort to craft such balanced legislation, legislators have carved a number of exceptions
out of copyright laws, under which a non-owner could use the copyrighted material without
facing threat of liability.17
Updates in Copyright Law Accommodate Internet Explosion
Technological advances taking place at the start of the new millennium afforded
copyright owners new opportunities to benefit from their creative works.1 8 At the same time,
those technological advances also provided additional opportunities for misappropriation of
copyrighted materials.' 9 Computers, in fact, have been referred to as the "world's greatest
20
copying machines."
Congress enacted the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") to accommodate the development and subsequent explosion of the Internet as a vehicle for reproducing
and distributing copyrighted material. 2 1 The DMCA is divided into Five Titles,2 2 but only
Title I and Title II are relevant to this Note. Title I implemented the "WIPO Treaties," a pair
of treaties designed to strengthen online intellectual property rights on a global basis.2 3 The
WIPO treaties will be discussed in greater depth below.
Title II of the DMCA amended earlier federal copyright law by limiting potential
liability of Internet Service Providers for copyright infringement violations. 24 These limitations on liability, referred to as the DMCA "safe harbor" provisions, set forth prerequisites an
25
ISP must satisfy to qualify for protection from liability.
According to one of the senators who contributed to the writing of the DMCA, the
purpose behind the legislation was to clarify ISP liability so that ISPs would be incentivized to
13 "Created" for the purposes of copyright law means "fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time." 2
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16, at 7-147 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.,

2010).
14 Id. at 7-152.

15Andrepont, supra note 3, at 397
16 id.

17 For example, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010), sets forth an exception to the copyright holder's exclusive rights to
copyrighted materials for the "fair use" of that material. In cases involving the "fair use" of copyrighted
material, no infringement liability attaches. See Id.
18 See Andrepont, supra note 3, at 398-99.
19See id.at 398.
20 Id. (quoting Wendy Leibowitz, Lawyers and Technology, NAT'L L.J. A16, (col. I), Nov. 2, 1998 at 914).
21 See id. at 398-97.
22 Id. at 410.
23 Id. at 402.
24 Id. at 413

25 See James Chadwick, Copyright Owners have the Burden of Policing Ruling in 'Viacom v. YouTube' is the
Latest in a Trend Involving the 'Storage' of Videos Under DMCA." 32 NAT'L L.J. 10 Col. I (Aug. 16, 2010).
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continue investing resources to maintain the Internet's speed and capacity. 2 6 The same senator theorized that by limiting the ISP's liability, the DMCA would ensure continued improvement in the Internet's efficiency while also ensuring the continued expansion of the variety
27
and quality of services available on the Internet.
Some academics have pointed out that the DMCA was enacted prior to YouTube's
actual development and therefore the protections available under that legislation were not
28
Nevertheless, as Youoriginally intended to cover YouTube and similar intermediaries.
Tube's Senior Product Counsel Larry Kavanaugh has explained, lower courts' interpretations

of the DMCA safe harbor provision have provided the "legal plumbing to allow small companies to innovate without the threat of crushing litigation," and thus Congress "struck the right
29
balance" in passing the legislation.
Historically, domestic (and foreign) legislation has required ISPs to take a passivereactive role30 in the battle against online copyright infringement, such that ISPs have only
3
been obligated to react ex post to notices of infringement. ' However, some commentators
believe that the role of ISPs has changed since the beginning of 2007.32 Their theory is that
the ISPs, in reaction to increased pressure from entertainment industries, government legisla-

tors, and regulatory agencies, have become more actively involved, such that ISPs must police
33
their networks to prevent copyright infringement ex ante.

Viacom v. YouTube: U.S. District Court Recently Affirms YouTube's Adherence to
"Notice and Take-Down" Regime is Legally Enough

Subsequent to the 1998 enactment of the DMCA, multiple cases have been litigated
in federal courts regarding the extent to which an ISP "hosting" 3 4 infringing material may

26 See Hannibal Travis, Opting Out of the Internet in the United States and the European Union: Copyright,
Safe Harbors,and International Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 331, 348 (2008) (quoting 144 Cong. Rec. 9234
(1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch)).
27 Id.
28 Webcast: Aspen Forum on The Internet and the Media - After the First Wave, What's Next?, held by the
Technology Policy Institute (Aug. 23, 2010) (http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/video/aspen201/1OO823internet-and media.php) [hereinafter TECH. POL'Y INST. APSEN FORUM]. (Professor Peter Menell, Professor of
Law at UC Berkely and Director of the Berkely Center for Law and Technology raised this point during a
discussion of whether U.S. legislation regarding ISP liability needed to be modernized to accommodate
increased piracy and counterfeiting problems).
29 id.

30 Under this regime, ISPs allow users to store and transmit content without "interference, modification, or
influence." de Beer& Clemmer, supra note 5, at 376.
31 Most (domestic and foreign) legislation regulating ISP involvement with copyright infringement requires the
ISP to take some specific action once the ISP has been made aware that infringing material has allegedly been
posted to the site. de Beer & Clemmer, supra note 5, at 376.
32 Id. at 375.

33 See de Beer & Clemmer, supra note 5, at 376.
34 For the purposes of 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c) (2010), YouTube is a service provider that may be eligible for safe
harbor protection in cases of copyright infringement "by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider," so long as
the service provider complies with the statute's remaining requirements. See de Beer & Clemmer, supra note 5,
at 382.
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have "knowledge" 3 5 of the infringement while still qualifying for DMCA safe harbor protection. 3 6 In Viacom, federal judge Louis J. Stanton, J., held that an ISP's "mere knowledge of
prevalence" of users' infringing activity on its site is insufficient to disqualify an ISP from the
DMCA's safe harbor protections. 37 According to the Viacom court, in order for an ISP like
have "knowledge
YouTube to lose statutory protection from secondary liability, the ISP must
38
of specific and identifiable infringements of particular individual items."
The court arrived at its decision nearly three years after the litigation commenced,
after Viacom and several affiliates brought suit against YouTube and parent company Google
for copyright infringement. 39 After YouTube moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that the DMCA's safe harbor provision protected it from liability, the plaintiffs cross-moved
for summary judgment relief, asserting that YouTube was ineligible for protection under the
safe harbor provision. 40 According to the plaintiffs, YouTube was liable for its users' infringing activity because, interalia, YouTube had "actual knowledge and [was] aware of facts and
41
According to one writer, the
circumstances from which infringing activity was apparent."
plaintiffs sought relief because they felt that, while YouTube purported to be merely a forum
content posted to the site
for User Generated Content ("UGC") 4 2 , a large amount of the actual
43
works.
copyrighted
Viacom's
of
copies
infringing
of
consisted
In its decision granting YouTube summary judgment, the court referred primarily to
the DMCA's legislative history. 44 The court also cited cases decided in other circuits to
support its proposition that YouTube's awareness of infringing activity was insufficient to
disqualify the ISP from safe harbor protection. 45 The court also refuted the plaintiffs' conten46
tions by distinguishing the Viacom case from MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. In Grokster, the Supreme Court held that "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting
its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
' 47
As the
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."
35 Pursuant to 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), an ISP will not be held liable for infringing material posted
to its site so long as the ISP does not have "actual" knowledge that the posted material is infringing, or "in
absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent," or "having obtained such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to
the material." See de Beer & Clemmer, supra note 5, at 383.
36 If protected by the Safe Harbor provision, a service provider "shall not be liable for monetary relief, or...
for injunctive or other equitable relief," for infringing material that has been posted by an Internet user. 17
U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1) (2010).
37 Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
38 id.
39 " Judge Sides With YouTube In Viacom Infringement Case, 165 INTELL. PRop. CouNs. 7 (September 2010).
40 Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
41 Id. (citing the parties' Notices of Motion).
42 One author has defined UGC by first defining "content" as movies, music and books, then categorizing UGC
as a "sub-set" of this traditional content. It is "creatively produced 'authorial' content" which is "protected by
copyright law." Greg Lastowka, User Generated Content and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J.ETr. & TECH. L.
893 (2008).
43 "Updates" Judge Sides With YouTube In Viacom Infringement Case. 165 I.P. CoUNs. 7 (September 2010).
44 Viacom, 718 F.Supp.2d at 514.
45 Id. at 523-27. (analyzing Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2009)); Corbis Corp. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004)).)).
46 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
47 Id. at 919.
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Viacom court pointed out, the Grokster case differed from the Viacom case because the defendant in Grokster distributed software that enabled "peer-to-peer" networks.4 8 The Viacom
court thus deemed the Grokster "model" inapplicable in cases like Viacom, where the service
provider like YouTube "furnishes a platform on which its users post and access all sorts of
materials as they wish, while the provider is unaware of its content, but identifies an agent to
receive complaints of infringement, and removes identified material when he learns it
49
infringes."
The Viacom court stated that based on plaintiffs' submissions on the motions, a jury
could find that YouTube had general awareness of and even "welcomed" its users' placement
of copyright-infringing material on the website.50 However, according to the court, "mere
knowledge of [the] prevalence of [infringing] activity" is insufficient to cause a website like
YouTube to lose DMCA safe harbor protection. 5 It was "uncontroverted" that when Viacom
provided YouTube with notice indicating the presence of a specific infringing work, YouTube
52
removed that work.
Accordingly, the court granted YouTube's motion for summary judgment that the
website qualified for protection under the DMCA. 53 By its order, the court therefore declined
to shift the "substantial" burden to investigate copyright infringement from the rights holder to
the ISP. 54 The underlying tenet in Viacom and cases similarly decided by courts in other
circuits 55 is that websites that provide "video-sharing services," and merely store UGC for
subscribers, 56 qualify for DMCA safe harbor protection so long as there is no "actual notice"
of the infringing activity.
E-Commerce Directive: EU's Version of DMCA Safe Harbor
The law under which the European Union operates provides ISPs with similar protections from secondary liability as those protections set forth by the DMCA. Under the
Treaty on European Union, 57 the European Council of Ministers 58 may issue directives,
which are binding on the EU member states but that may, to some degree, be implemented
48 According to the Grokster Court, "Peer-to-peer" networks enable computers to communicate directly with
each other, not through central servers. Though its possible the software can be used for legitimate purposes,
recipients of such "peer-to-peer" software have mostly used the software to share copyrighted music and video
files without authorization. Id. at 919-20.
49 Viacom, 718 F.Supp.2d at 526.

50 Id. at 518
"' Id. at 523.
52 Id. at 526.

51 Id. at 529
14 Id. at 523.
55 See Chadwick, supra note 25 (discussing the courts' decisions in 1o Group Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 586
F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Calif. 2008), and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081
(C.D. Cal. 2008)).

56 Such websites include Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, etc.
57 Now called the "Treaty of Maastricht," this treaty, which entered into force in 1993, established the
European Union by changing the structure of the former European Community. See Treaties and Law,
EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index en.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
58 The European Council of Ministers is the main "decision-maker" of the EU and shares legislative duties with
the European Parliament. Michael J. McCormick, A Primeron the European Union and Its Legal System, 2002
ARMY LAW. 1, 4 (2002).
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differently between the states. 59 One such directive, the Electronic Commerce Directive
("ECD"), sets forth safe harbors for ISPs using wording very similar to the corresponding
provision under the DMCA. 60 Specifically, the ECD requires member states to ensure ISPs
will not be held liable for storing a subscriber's information, so long as the ISP does not have
"actual knowledge of illegal activity or information," but "upon obtaining such knowledge or
61
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information."
Moreover, just as the court in Viacom refused to place an affirmative burden on ISPs
to police against copyright infringement, the ECD prohibits member states from imposing an
affirmative burden on ISPs to proactively investigate or monitor the legality of the information stored by the website's users. 62 And while the ECD does allow for injunctive or administrative efforts to prevent or terminate infringement, it states that any such efforts undertaken
63
must be consistent with the principle of freedom of expression.
Accordingly, a comparison between the United States' and the EU's domestic law in
the area of secondary liability for ISPs suggests that a court in the EU would reach the same
decision as the court in Viacom.
International Harmonization of IPR: From WIPO to ACTA
It has been said that differences in domestic IP enforcement regimes have resulted in
the overall weakening of copyright law. 64 One appealing solution has therefore been to craft
a global set of international copyright laws instead of relying on different domestic regimes to
65
uphold intellectual property rights.
The roots of modern international Intellectual Property law can be traced back to the
Paris Convention of 1883 and the Berne Convention of 1886,66 two multilateral 67 agreements
that signified enhanced "international cooperation" regarding intellectual property. 68 Although not the first copyright treaty, the Berne Convention is considered significant in that it
69
constituted the first "international treatment" of copyright.
51 See Travis, supra note 26, at 340 (citing Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European

Community art. 249, 2006 O.J. (C321) 37, 153).
60 See id. at 365.
61 Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects
of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L178) 1,
13 [hereinafter Council Directive].
62 Id.
63 id at 6.

64 See Scott Burger, Note, Eradication of a Secondary Infringer's Safe Havens: The Need for a Multilateral
Treaty Addressing Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 18 MICH. ST. J.INT'L L. 143, 157 (2009).
65 Id.

66 Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLus WORLD: THE

WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (WIPO) 4 (2003), available athttp:// www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economiclIssues/
Multilateral-Agreements-in-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf.
67 "Multilateral" indicates that a large number of states participate in the treaty or trading system. This is in
contrast to a "global" agreement or system, which would include all states. See What is the World Trade
Organization? WTO http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif-e/fact ie.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2011).
68 Musungu & Dutfield, supra note 66.
69 See Burger, supra note 64, at 148.
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In response to treaty making in intellectual property, various international organizations formed in order to resolve related issues.70 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) became a specialized agency of the United Nations ("UN") in 1974, 7 1 its goal
being to "promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world." 72 As of July
15, 2003, WIPO counted 179 states as members. 7 3 WIPO does not itself set minimum standards for IP protection, but instead strives to accomplish its objective by administering a
74
collection of treaties.
A number of developed countries, including the United States, perceived WIPO's
regime to be too lenient 75 to sufficiently protect IPR 76 on an international basis, and thus
lobbied for an alternative forum for stricter IPR enforcement. 77 Their requests were ulti78
mately satisfied at the conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATI')
Uruguay Round 79 of negotiations, with the creation of the World Trade Organization

(,,W~TO").8o

Like WIPO, the WTO is an intergovernmental organization ("IGO") that regulates a
"broad terrain of international trade relations."81 WTO incorporates the GATT system of
international trade norms while also building upon them to include trade in services and intellectual property. 82 Over 150 countries are currently WTO members, and as such their trade
70 Musungu & Dutfield, supra note 66.
71 Id.

72 Emily Ayoob, Recent Development: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 28 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 175, 177 (quoting Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPSPLus WORLD: THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION (WIPO) 11 (2003), available at http://

www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/ssues/Multilatera-Agreements-in-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf.).
73 Musungu & Dutfield, supra note 72.
74 Ayoob, supra note 72, at 177.
75 In contrast, many developing countries favored the permissive nature of the WIPO regime, because it
allowed them to pick and choose from a menu of treaties and therefore enabled them to tailor their IP regimes to
meet their development goals. See Musungu & Dutfield, supra note 66, at 10.
76 For those states seeking enhanced international IPR enforcement, the permissive nature of the rules under the
WIPO regime (which enabled states to pick and choose treaties) and the lack of enforcement measures, caused
these states to conclude that WIPO failed to secure adequate levels of IP protection. See Musungu & Dutfield,
supra note 66.
77 Ayoob, supra note 72, at 177.
78 GATT provided the rules for a great deal of world trade during the period from 1948 through 1994. GATT
also presided over periods that saw some of the highest growth rates in international commerce. Although it
appeared well-established, it was merely a provisional agreement and organization. See The GATT Years: From
Havana to Marrakesh; WTO.ORG, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif-e/fact4_e.htm (last visited
Jan. 7, 2011).
79 GATT helped establish a strong multilateral trading system, involving a number of different rounds of trade
negotiations. The Uruguay Round came about after the GATT system experienced a great deal of trouble and
needed an overhaul. The negotiating agenda for the Uruguay round of trade negotiations covered virtually
every outstanding trade policy issue. Id.
80 At the conclusion of the Uruguay Rounds, the WTO replaced GATI as the "organization overseeing the
multilateral trading system." "organization overseeing the multilateral trading system." The 128 Countries that
had Signed GATT by 1994, WTO.ORG, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/gattmem.ie.htm (last visited Jan.
7, 201 l).The GATIT organization mainly dealt with trade in goods, while the WTO and its agreements now
cover additional issues, including IP. See also What is the World Trade Organization?WTO.oRG, http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif-e/factle.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
81 ,....
.broad terrain of international trade relations." PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 88 (OXFORD 2nd ed. 2010).)
82 Id. at 89.
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agreements dealing with intellectual property must satisfy the WTO standard, which is en83
forceable through WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.
WTO administers a "broad package" of trade agreements, but only one addresses the
field of intellectual property, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS"). 8 4 However, the TRIPS agreement is arguably the "most important instrument in the realm of international copyright, ' 8 5 and that agreement "exemplifies the perceived
advantages of the trade process in resolving differences over intellectual property
86
protection."
With the inclusion of several countries that had not participated in the Berne Convention, it was hoped that TRIPS would increase copyright "harmony." 87 It has been said that
the WTO's comprehensive dispute settlement system has resulted in the first effective dispute
88
resolution procedures for copyright and other international intellectual property relations.
TRIPS has further changed the international intellectual property regime by "introducing the
principle of minimum intellectual property standards." 89 To that end, any IP agreement negotiated post-TRIPS and involving WTO members can only create higher IP standards. 90 This
91
concept is commonly referred to as "TRIPS-plus."
The WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 built upon earlier efforts and expanded interna92
tional copyright principles "beyond traditional borders" and into the digital landscape.
However, none of the aforementioned efforts addressed secondary liability, resulting in a gap
93
with respect to international standards for secondary liability for ISPs.
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Negotiating a Plurilateral Treaty
to Harmonize IPR Enforcement
The most recent development in the efforts to craft an international IPR regime began in early 2007 when the United States and several of its trading partners started negotiating
an agreement to harmonize various aspects of international IPR, including ISP secondary liability. In late 2010, the parties completed final negotiations for a proposed multilateral treaty,
referred to as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ("ACTA").94 The countries that participated in the ACTA negotiations included the United States, the European Union, Japan,
Switzerland, Australia, Canada, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, and the

83 Id.
84 Id.
85 id.

86 Id. at 72.
87 Ayoob, supra note 72.
88 GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 9t, at 74-75.

89 Musungu & Dudfield, supra note 72, at 2.
90 Id.
91 TRIPS-plus covers activities that either increase rights protection or reduce limitations on rights and
exceptions. Id.
92 Burger, supra note 64, at 149
9' See id.

94 Ayoob, supra note 72, at 175-76.
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United Arab Emirates. 95 A number of states, including Argentina, Brazil, and China, were
96
excluded from negotiations.
The idea to establish a new multilateral agreement on IP enforcement emerged after
the first Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting ("GCCC"). 97 The GCCC was convened by a combination of three international trading organizations (including WIPO) as well
as a collection of international business organizations.98 These groups convened the GCCC in
order to address the numerous "adverse costs to social welfare and economic development
that was resulting from the rampant theft of intellectual property." 99 The GCCC hosted a
series of meetings, the product of which was "The G8 Statement," a document that stated the
t °°
need for increased enforcement against IP piracy and counterfeiting.
Between November 2005 and January 2007, GCCC meeting attendees considered
the G8 Statement in conjunction with a proposal Japan had issued calling for a new international agreement on counterfeiting and piracy.' 0 ' The attendees promised to consider Japan's
proposal.10 2 In fact, the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") indicated that the
United States and Japan had already jointly considered a new multilateral treaty to combat
counterfeiting and piracy as early as 2006, and that preliminary discussions regarding that
matter had taken place from 2006 through 2007, between countries such as the United States,
Canada, the European Union, Japan, and Switzerland. 1 0 3 On October 23, 2007, USTR Carol
C. Schwab publicly announced that the United States and "some of its key trading partners"
were looking to "negotiate a new, higher benchmark for enforcement"; she emphasized that
these negotiations were not to take place within any pre-existing international

organizations. 104
The final ACTA text agreement was publicized via Dr. Michael Geist's blog on
December 6, 2010.105 On December 17, 2010, the USTR issued a public request for comments on the ACTA, to provide additional consideration before the United States' signing of
the agreement. 10 6 With respect to the actual "finality" of the agreement, a press release statement from the office of the USTR merely indicated that following the "legal verification of

95 Margot Kaminski, Note, Recent Development, The Originsand Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247, 250 (2009).
96 Id.

97 About

the Congress, GLOBAL

CONGRESS:

COMBATING

COUTER.FErrING

&

PMAcy,

http://www.

ccapcongress.net/about.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
98 Id.
99 Ayoob, supra note 72, at 178 (quoting Global Congress Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy, About the
Global Congress, http://www.ccapcongress.net/about/about.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 id.
103 Id.

104 Id. at 179 (quoting Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Schwab
Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-trade-agreementfight-fakes.).
105 See Michael Geist, Final Version of ACTA Posted, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG, (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.
michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5499/196/.

106 USTR Seeks Comments by February 15 on ACTA, 81 PTCJ 263, available at http://news.bna.com/ptln/
display/batch-print display.adp.
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the drafting, the proposed agreement [would] then be ready to be submitted to the partici07
pants' respective authorities to undertake relevant domestic processes."'
HI. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DEBATE
As explained in Part I, the Viacom court decided that YouTube's adherence to its
"Notice and Take-Down" regime was sufficient to carry out its obligations in the fight against
online copyright infringement. 10 8 However, this decision faces some challenges from domestic and international legal systems.
Viacom Court's Approach Challenged by Developments in Domestic Legislation
In December 2010, Viacom appealed the district court's decision to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, with some legal commentators surmising that the issue would
lead to a circuit split. 1 9 Advocates for both parties have likewise filed comprehensive ami110
cus briefs on the issue.
Daniel Mandil, general counsel of the Motion Picture Association of America, indicated he would be filing an amicus brief on Viacom's behalf because service providers "have
a real serious legal responsibility to attend to online copyright infringement," and this "principle . ..needs to be defended and needs to be upheld by the appellate court." Mr. Mandil
described the issue from a legal standpoint. However, advocates for increasing the ISP's
obligation to police against copyright infringement have also framed the argument from an
economic standpoint. As such, they have emphasized the substantial undisputed evidence that
online copyright piracy has robbed profits from influential entertainment corporations and
creative artists,1I I and thus fought with increased tenacity to increase the burden placed on the
ISPs to police against copyright infringement activity.
One attorney, who planned to file an amicus brief on Viacom's behalf, called copyright infringement a "cat-and-mouse game" and opined that the "Notice and Take-Down"
regime was "no way to keep up with infringement." There must be, in her opinion, "some
onus on the service provider who is making money from [protected] content to take responsibility.""'2 Moreover, a group of legislators recently took action to increase prosecution of
online counterfeiting with the potential incidental effect of increasing ISP's burden to "police"
against such acts.11 On September 20, 2010, the Combating Online Infringement and Coun107 Press Release, Office of USTR, U.S., Participants Finalize Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Text,
http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
log See supra Part One.
109 See e.g., Amanda Bronstad, Viacom v. YouTube Appeal May Decide Futureof Web, LAWTECHNOLOGYNEWS

.COM (Dec. 14, 2010) available at 2010 LEXIS 1202476144090.)
110 Id.
IIITECH. POL'Y INST. ASPEN FORUM, supra note 29 (President of Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) Cary Sherman estimates 50% decline in music industry sales revenue over the last 10 years. Asserts
online piracy a major factor in the decline).
112 Bronstad, supra note 109, at 114.
113See Senators Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Combat Online Infringement, 80 PTCJ 679 LEGISLATION/
COPYRIGHTS, available at (http://0-news.bna.com.libweb.hofstra.edu/ptln/) (follow "News Archive" hyperlink;
then follow "2010" hyperlink; then follow "09/24/10" hyperlink; then follow "Legislation/Copyrights"
hyperlink) (last visited Sep. 24, 2010).PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) (Sept. 24, 2010) (http://0-
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terfeits Act (S. 3804) bipartisan bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate. 114 According to Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), legislators hope that by "coordinating [their] efforts with industry
stakeholders and law enforcement officials, [they'll] be better able to target those who are
profiting from illegal activity." 115 The Act would give the U.S. Attorney's Office the authority to shut down websites that are "dedicated to infringing activities," and notably, would
impose upon ISPs an affirmative duty to stop doing business with such an infringing website.1 16 Thus, while YouTube and similar ISPs have benefitted from current copyright laws
without having to "police" against copyright infringement, these developments indicate that
t7
there is legislative movement to change that area of the law."
Advocates for Flexible Copyright Legislation Support Viacom Court's Approach
While there are those who support a copyright regime that would require ISPs to
take a more active role in preventing infringement, there have also been a number of opponents against the use of such a regime." 8 In its motion for summary judgment, Google
highlighted a number of reasons why it would be impractical to obligate ISPs like YouTube to
proactively investigate and filter out its users' infringing posts."t 9 Google asserted that
Viacom purposefully uploaded its own clips to YouTube for marketing purposes.' 20 While
that specific assertion cannot be unequivocally accepted as factual, it does illuminate various
flaws in the argument that ISPs should proactively investigate infringement, instead of relying
solely on the "Notice and Take-Down" regime.
There are a number of circumstances under which infringing content can be posted
without the ISP's knowledge or awareness. For instance, an aspiring filmmaker may claim
copyright infringement after the work he had posted on the Internet was copied without au-

news.bna.com.libweb.hofstra.edu/ptln/) (follow "News Archive" hyperlink then follow "2010" hyperlink then
follow "09/24/10" hyperlink then follow "News" hyperlink then follow "Legislation/Copyrights" hyperlink)
114 Press Release, Senator Orrin Hatch, Senators Introduce Bill to Combat Online Piracy, Counterfeiting (Sept.
21, 2010), available at (http://hatch.senate.gov/public/)(follow "news room" hyperlink; then follow "Press
Releases" hyperlink; then follow "September 2010" hyperlink).Press Release, Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch,
Senators Introduce Bill to Combat Online Piracy, Counterfeiting (Sept. 21, 2010), http://hatch.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressReleaseid=3529eac8- lb78-be3e-e007-14ad6c807d
44&Month=9&Year=-2010.
115Id.
116 See Senators Introduce Bipartisan Billto Combat Online Infringement, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) (Sept. 24, 2010) (http://O-news.bna.com.libweb.hofstra.edu/ptln/) (follow "News Archive" hyperlink
then follow "2010" hyperlink then follow "09/24/10" hyperlink then follow "Legislation/Copyrights"
hyperlink)
117See IP Enforcement Plan Judged 'Moderate'But Some Worry About ISPs Acting as 'Cops',80 PTCJ 686
CONFERENCES/ENFORCEMENT (Sept. 24, 2010) (follow "News Archive" hyperlink then follow "2010" hyperlink
then follow "09/24/2010" hyperlink then follow "Conferences/Enforcement" hyperlink) (known hereafter as
"ISP Cops") See IP Enforcement Plan Judged "Moderate" but Some Worry About ISPs Acting as "Cops," PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGTrr J. (BNA) (Sept. 24, 2010) (http://O-news.bna.com.libweb.hofstra.edu/ptln) (follow
"News Archive" hyperlink then follow "2010" hyperlink then follow "09/24/2010" hyperlink then follow

"Conferences/Enforcement" hyperlink) (known hereafter as "ISP Cops")
118 See de Beer & Clemmer, supra note 5,at 377.
119 Andy Greenberg, The Most Cringeworthy Quotes From The Viacom/YouTube Spat, FORBES-BLOC, http://
www.forbes.com/sites/velocity/2010/03/18/the-most-cringeworthy-quotes-from-the-viacomyoutube-spat/ (last
visited Dec. 14, 2010).
120 id.
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thorization and stored in a different area other than where he first posted it, while, at the
opposite end of the spectrum, marketing executives working for a protected professional TV
12
show may post a clip for viral marketing purposes. '
Ironically, while the Viacom court held that it was sufficient for YouTube to rely on
"Take Down Notices," the website has elected to implement a variety of tools to assist copyrights holders in protecting their rights and controlling their content. t 2 2 One such tool is a
copyright enforcement system called "Content ID," which enables YouTube to resolve copyright infringement issues in a way that will provide the rights holder with the greatest satisfaction.' 23 The rights holder sends YouTube the files to which he owns the rights, and then
selects the action YouTube must take if and when a user finds his file. 12 4 Such a tool makes
it possible to protect the copyright holder's rights while still providing YouTube users with
the content they so desire.
It seems as if YouTube's decision to enact measures instead of merely relying on
take down notices would satisfy even those members of the media and entertainment industries who spoke out in favor of enhanced IPR protection following the Viacom decision. For
example, Cary Sherman, President of the Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA"), once indicated that even though he had disagreed with the court's decision, he still
appreciated the effort YouTube put forth to cooperate with content providers. 125 According
to Mr. Sherman, legislation is "too slow and inflexible" to provide a sufficient solution to
copyright infringement. Mr. Sherman indicated that the RIAA believed that voluntary efforts
to promote cooperation between rights holders and ISPs would provide the best tool to combat
the infringement.1 26 In 2008, the RIAA publicized this sentiment by announcing its plan to
abandon unpopular lawsuits waged against individual file-sharers in favor of increasing col27
laborative efforts with ISPs.1
Foreign Court Decisions Imply Issues Also Remains Unresolved Abroad
Just as a debate continues domestically over the proper role of ISPs in regulating IPR
protection, a similar debate likewise wages abroad. Companies like Google must be especially cognizant of varying foreign domestic laws on IPR because the borderless nature of the
28
Internet means Google is accountable to "hundreds" of different legal systems at one time. 1
Varying national legal systems create substantial uncertainty for Google, despite the fact that
121
122

See BALLON, supra note 7, at 4-370.
See Resources for Content Owners, YouTUBE.COM, http://www.youtube.com/t/copyright-owners

(last

visited Nov. 12, 2011).
123 See Content ID, YouTUBE.COM, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
124 Id. (such action includes blocking the video or receiving a portion of the profits from an advertisement

preceding the video).
125 See TECH. POL'Y INST. ASPEN FORUM, supra note 28.
126 Id.

127 Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (Dec. 2010).
128 Andre Jaglom, Internet Distribution, E-Commerce and Other Computer Related Issues: Current
Developments in Liability On-Line, Business Methods Patents and Software Distribution, Licensing and
Copyright Questions, A.L.I -A.B.A. CLE (June 4, 2010), available at http://www.ali-aba.org/index.cfm?fuse

action=online.preview&segmentid=21698 (last visited Jan. 15 201 1)(stating that because Internet use is now
"ubiquitous" and "hundreds" of countries currently have Internet access, it raises issues as to which law governs
and where an Internet company may be subject to jurisdiction. Different countries have different laws relating
IP infringement (as well as defamation, free speech, etc)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

13

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 9
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEss & LAW

12 9
Foreign
the EU operates under a single directive regarding secondary liability for ISPs.
national courts conflict over the best interpretation of the single directive. A brief survey of
these varying laws demonstrates how the central inquiry varies as well when determining
whether an ISP should be held secondarily liable, depending on the country.
Canada and the United Kingdom, two countries that impose "stricter" standards for
secondary liability, focus on the extent of the ISP's authorization of direct infringement and
control over the infringing activities when assessing liability. 130 In fact, courts in these countries have characterized authorization of copyright infringement as direct infringement liabil3
ity for the ISP.' 1

Secondary liability standards in Australia appear to be more relaxed. In Roadshow
Films v. iiNet Limited,' 32 the Federal Court of Australia held that an ISP was not liable for
copyright infringement, even where the ISP had knowledge that such infringement was occur133
ring and did not take any steps to prevent it.
Different "flavors" of secondary liability for ISPs emerge even within the EU, despite the fact that all EU nations are governed under the over-arching concepts embodied in
the Electronic Commerce Directive (ECD). 134 As described above, the ECD sets forth a "safe
t 35
harbor provision" for ISPs similar to those set forth in the United States' DMCA.
A number of national courts in the European Union system have denied ISPs the safe
harbor protections of the directive. For example, in Tiscali Media v. Dargaudet al.,13 6 the
French Cour de Cassation13 7 held that an ISP was not immune from copyright infringement
liability under the directive. 1 38 The court's decision turned on its definition of "host" in that
the court in this case held that the ISP functioned not merely as a service provider, but a
publisher as well, because it displayed paid advertising on infringing websites of its customers. 139 Thus, the French court rejected the defendant's argument that the ISP was immune
under the EU E-Commerce Directive's "hosting services providers" provision. 140 As one
attorney pointed out, the decision would have "dramatic" consequences for websites like YouTube and Facebook, who also "go beyond hosting" by placing advertisements next to posted
14 1
content and who also might edit content that has been posted by their users.
129 The European Community's Electronic Commerce Directive ("ECD"), sets forth safe harbors for ISPs akin
to those available under U.S. law. See Council Directive, supra note 61 and accompanying text.
130 Burger, supra note 64, at 153.
131 id.
132 Roadshow Films v. iiNet Limited (No. 3) (2010) Federal Court of Australia 24 (Austl.).
133 See Jaglom, supra note 128 (citing Roadshow Films v. iiNet Ltd, (No. 3) [2010] Federal Court of Australia
24).

04 Council Directive, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
135 See Travis, supra note 26, at 365.
136 Tiscali Media v. Dargaud et al., Cour de Cassation (1st section, civil), 14 January 2010, (Telecom Italia
(formerly Tiscali Media) v. the companies Dargaud Lombard and Lucky Comics).
137 "The Cour de Cassation is the highest court in the French judiciary". Marc Lemperiere, e80: French Cour
de Cassation Threatens Web 2.0, EVERSHEDS.COM (Mar. 12, 2010), https://www.eversheds.com/uk/home/
articles/index I.page?ArticleID=templatedata\Eversheds\articles\data\en\E80\e80_FrenchCour deCassation_
threatensWeb_2_120310.
138 Jaglom, supra note 128 (citing Tiscali Media v. Darguad et. al., Cour de Cassation (1st section, civil), 14
January 2010).
139 Id.

140 id.

141 Lemperiere, supra note 137.
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As a result of the lack of conformity regarding secondary liability for ISPs among
national legal systems, YouTube remains embroiled in a number of lawsuits that have been
brought to different European courts by various European media companies. 142 YouTube has
so far been victorious in at least one of these foreign cases. Charges brought to the Spanish
43
courts by Spanish Broadcaster Gestevision Telesinco SA against YouTube were dismissed. 1
In that case, the court in Madrid, like the Viacom court, held that copyright owners, and not
the ISPs, are responsible for identifying infringing material and alerting the ISP that specific
material should be removed. 144 Representatives from Google's legal team said that the court
in that case interpreted the E-Commerce Directive to require ISPs like YouTube to remove
1 45
infringing posts only after having been notified of the specific posting.
In a posting on Google's corporate blog, corporate representatives commented on the
"wisdom" of European laws in reaching this decision and stated that the decision would not
only affect YouTube, but would also affect ISPs like Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace. 14 6 A
decision opposing YouTube, would have the effect of forcing ISPs to screen "all videos,
photos, and text before allowing them on a website," which would cause these media giants to
"grind to a halt."' 147
In the case above, the foreign court decided in YouTube's favor, and some believe
the decision from the Spanish court will influence decisions from other courts, 148 but the fact
remains that this decision is not precedential for any other European court's decision. YouTube is still vulnerable to liability for millions or billions of dollars worth of damages in suits
still to come.
To that end, one month prior to the decision handed down by the Madrid court, the
Hamburg Regional Court of Germany decided that YouTube might be liable for damages
stemming from videos that were posted to the website without the rights holder's permission
for rebroadcast. 149 In stark contrast to the decisions set forth by both the the Southern District
of New York and the Madrid courts, the Hamburg Court concluded that YouTube was "treating content uploaded by its users as its own," resulting in a more "strenuous duty" to police
the content, and that YouTube failed to sufficiently fulfill that duty.150 As one of the attorneys for Google Hamburg pointed out, the Hamburg court's decision created "substantial
5
legal uncertainty" for Google and other ISPs in Germany.' '
142 David Bario, Google, YouTube Beat Back Spanish Copyright Suit over Unauthorized Content, THE AM
LAW DAILY (Sept. 23, 2010, 1:29 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/09/youtube-telecinco.
html.
143 See id.
'44 See id.
145 See Aaron Ferstman, A Big Win for the Internet, GOOGLE EUR. POL'Y BLOG (Sept. 23, 2010, 10:27 AM),

http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com2010/09big-win-for-internet.html
146 Id.
147 id.

148 Id.

149Landgericht Hamburg [LG Hamburg] [District Court of Hamburg] Mar. 9, 2010, 308 0 27/09 (Ger.); see
Jann Friedrich Bettinga & Ragnhild Kjetland, German Court Limits YouTube's Use of Copyrighted Online
Video Material, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 3, 2010, 4:33 PM), http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2010-09-03/
hamburg-court-limits-youtube-use-of-uploaded-material-that-is-copyrighted.html.
150 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, YouTube Loses Case Over Brightman Songs, M&C NEWS (Sept. 03, 2010), http:/
/www.monstersandcritics.cominews/europe/news/article 1582216.php/YouTube-loses-case-in-German-courtover-Brightman-songs.
Il See Friedrich Bettinga & Kjetland, supra note 149.
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In addition to a number of foreign decisions that suggest the notice and take down
regime is insufficient to protect ISPs from liability, there has been some movement, both on
legislative and non-legislative fronts, that indicate a desire to place additional obligations on
ISPs to police against infringement. 1 52 In France and the UK, for instance, there has been
movement toward enacting legislation that will obligate ISPs to undertake a "graduated response" regime to combating copyright infringement.' 53 In fact, before the more recent versions of the ACTA text were released to the public, it was believed ACTA would include a
provision to affirmatively obligate ISPs to undertake such a regime. 154 However, ACTA texts
55
released to the public most recently have not had any sort of affirmative obligation.'
ACTA Heavily Critiqued, but Final Agreement Will Likely Have Little Influence
on ISP Secondary Liability
For a period of time, it appeared that new international law making, in the form of
the proposed ACTA, threatened to overturn the balance achieved by the Viacom court's decision. However, developments that have occurred since initial ACTA negotiations suggest that
the agreement, if successfully implemented, would not pose a threat to the decision. Instead
of requiring the ISPs to act as copyright police, the agreement now affords the negotiating
parties broad flexibility in enforcing their particularized enforcement regimes.1 56 ACTA's
finalized text fails to delineate the scope of the ISP's obligations and liabilities. If anything, it
only further clouds the issue, as it merely requires participating states "adopt[ ] or maintain[ ]
a regime providing for limitations on the liability of, or on the remedies available against,
157
online service providers while preserving the legitimate interests of the right holder."'

See David W. Quist, Three Strikes and You're Out: A Survey of Foreign Approaches to Preventing
Copyright Infringement on the Internet, 66 Bus. LAW. 261, 261 (2010).
153incontrast to the "Notice and Take-Down" regime, where the ISP acts by removing infringing material that
152

has already been posted, a "graduated response" regime would engage the ISP in action directly against the
infringing subscriber. It is known alternatively as a "three strikes" regime, in that the ISP would be required to
suspend or terminate a subscriber's account after three incidents claimed or actual copyright infringment. See
id. at 261.
114 Id. at 266.
I" Id. 266-67.
156See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, art. 27 11 1-2, Dec. 03, 2010, European Commission, http://
[hereinafter
ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/anti-counterfeiting/
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Text]; see also Michael Geist, Final Version of ACTA Posted, MICHAEL
GEIST (Dec. 06, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5499/196/ [hereinafter Geist, Final Version].
Article 27, entitled "Enforcement in the Digital Environment," sets forth the final agreement with respect to ISP
involvement in copyright infringement protection. Paragraph 1 requires, in pertinent part, each negotiating
party ensure that those civil and criminal enforcement procedures agreed upon under the agreement are
available under law to "permit effective action against an act of infringement . . . including expeditious
remedies to prevent infringement and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements."
Paragraph 2 elaborates on the first paragraph, specifying that each party's enforcement procedures "shall be
implemented in a manner that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate activity, including electronic
commerce, and, consistent with that Party's law, preserves fundamental principles such as freedom of
expression, fair process, and privacy." It contains a footnote that states, by way of example, a Party adopting a
regime to limit liability available against an ISP while simultaneously preserving the legitimate interests of the
rights holder.
157Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Text, supra note 156.
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It is still highly questionable to what extent ACTA will be implemented by its various negotiating parties. 158 Academics, legislators, and commentators from across the globe
have critiqued ACTA as a proposed solution to lack of transnational conformity in IPR and
ISP secondary liability. These critiques highlight additional reasons why the finalized ACTA
agreement will not resolve the current issue of ISP liability.
The first aspect of ACTA that has been analyzed and critiqued has been the negotiating process. One might expect that such a multilateral trade agreement would be proposed
first within established trade and IP fora such as the WTO or WIPO. 159 Instead, the contracting countries decided to negotiate independently and to the exclusion of a number of
countries that are parties to the established trade groups. 160 Such a closed negotiating process
directly conflicts with the sort of open and cooperative relationship that must be fostered
between the content providers and the legitimate ISPs.
Moreover, many critics have pointed to the lack of transparency as another troublesome feature of the negotiation processes. 16 Negotiations began in 2008 behind closed
doors, and it was not until recent months that the parties authorized the release of portions of
the drafted agreement to the public. 162 In the interim, several public interest groups had
started a suit against the Bush administration for the release of the negotiations, only dropping
the suit after the Obama administration entered and proclaimed it would continue the Bush
administration's "non-disclosure" policy.' 63 Such a lack of transparency throughout the negotiating process was especially disconcerting considering that the provisions of the tentative
agreement that have become public strongly suggest that the agreement will "'potentially
164
change[ ] United States law by transforming' civil infringement into criminal acts."'
James Love, the director of the NGO "Knowledge Ecology International," commented about various ambiguities present in ACTA draft released to the public on October 2,
2010.165 Love pointed out that the agreement sets forth a number of different obligations for
the parties regarding the enforcement of IP rights.166 Notably, there are some cases where
exceptions to obligations are expressly written into the agreement, while there are other provisions that do not include such express exceptions. 167 As Love explained, the agreement was
therefore ambiguous in whether exceptions were available only where expressly written into
the agreement, or whether exceptions were also available in other circumstances.' 68 The

158Mike Masnick, Let's Face Facts: ACTA is Called an 'Executive Agreement' to Change the Law With Less

Hassle Than a Treaty, TECH DIRT (Feb. 9, 2010, 05:17 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/arnicles/20100209/
1505538101.shtml.
159See Ayoob, supra note 72, at 176.
160 See id.

161Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade, 44 INT'L LAW. 93, 97 (2010).
162 Id.

163 Id.
164Mart
Kuhn, Intellectual Property Owners Oppose Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE, (July 14, 2010, 10:50 AM), http://www.publicknowledge.orgblog/ip-owners-oppose-acta
(quoting Letter from Douglas K. Norman, President of Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass'n, to Hon. Ron Kirk,
Ambassador (June 25, 2010), available at http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE
=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=26212.
165 James Love, Areas Where the Oct. 2, 2010 ACTA Text is Inconsistent with U.S. Law, KNOWLEDGE

ECOLOGY INT'L (Oct. 9, 2010, 9:59AM), http://www.keionline.org/node/970.
166 id.
167 id.

168 Id.
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availability of exceptions would be particularly important in cases where a contracting party's
domestic law set forth different obligations from those provided in the ACTA agreement.
The general tone and obligations set forth in the provisions of the publicized final
text differ greatly from those used in preliminary versions of the agreement. 169 The United
States started negotiations intending to obligate the contracting parties to agree to a strict IP
rights enforcement regime.1 70 However, scholars suggest that the finalized text of the agreement indicates that the United States compromised on many of the areas of strict enforcement
1 71
it originally sought- including imposition of higher standards of liability on intermediaries.
The current form of the agreement has been described as a much "weaker" version of the strict
172
enforcement regime initially proposed.
For some time, it was feared that the ACTA agreement would include a provision
1 73
that would impose the affirmative obligation upon ISPs to incorporate a "three-strikes"
174
However, the text of the agreement most
provision for online copyright infringement.
recently released to the public included no such provision, and instead required only that
negotiating parties "promote cooperative efforts within the business community to address
infringement."1 75 One U.S. official has been quoted saying that the proposed "three-strikes"
1 76
requirement provision "had been 'dropped out'" of the earlier version of the text.
With the "final" version of the ACTA text released to the public, some have expressed concern that the process of implementing the agreement into law would be unconstitutional. 177 For example, American University's Program on Information Justice and
Intellectual Property (PIJIP) posted to its website a letter sent to President Barack Obama, by
a collection of American law professors, in which the professors expressed their concern over
the USTR's declaration that the United States could sign onto the ACTA agreement by virtue
of it being a sole executive agreement. 178 As explained in the letter, one of the reasons it was
particularly important the agreement undergo the correct legal process to be implemented as
law was that "the agreement may complicate legislative efforts to solve widely recognized
policy dilemmas," including in the area of secondary copyright liability. 179 Sean Flynn, As169 Michael Geist, Digital Advocacy's "Weak Ties" Should Not be Underestimated, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG

(Oct. 18, 2010) http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5381/159/.
170 Id.
171 Daniel Pruzin & Nathan Pollard, U.S., EU to Iron Out Reservations As Draft ACTA Text is Released, 80
PTCJ 778 (2010), available at http://0-news.bna.com.libweb.hofstra.edu/ptln/PTLNWB/split-display.adp?fedf

id=18004156&vname=ptcjnotallissues&wsn=497109000&searchid= 15622638&doctypeid= l&type=date&
mode=doc&split=0&scm=PTLNWB&pg=0.
172Rob Pegoraro, Almost-Final, Much Weaker ACTA Draft Published, posting to Faster Forward,
WASHINGTON POST.COM, (Oct. 7, 2010, 06:54 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/2010/10/

latestacta details-still lea.html.
173 See Quist, supra note 152, at 261. The "three-strikes" mechanism has been defined as one that "suspends or
terminates a subscriber's internet account after some number [depending on the jurisdiction] of incidents
involving claimed or actual infringement of another's intellectual property."
174 id.
... Id. at 267.
176 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Final; Group Calls Process 'Unconstitutional', 81 PTCJ 72 (2010),

available at http://O-news.bna.com.libweb.hofstra.edu/ptin/PTLNWB/spit-display.adp?fedfid=l8556708&
vname=ptcjnotallissues&fn=18556708&jd=ptcj8 172&split=O.
177 Id.

178 Brook Baker et al., Over 75 Law Profs Call for Halt of ACTA, PIJP (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.
wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/academic-sign-on-letter-to-obama-on-acta#-ftnref6.
179 Id.
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sociate Director of PIJIP, articulated a number of reasons why it would be unconstitutional for
the agreement to be implemented into law by virtue of being a sole executive agreement.18 0
Interestingly, one of the ACTA provisions purports to encourage the cooperation
between intermediaries and content providers in order to defeat online piracy. Such a provision is aligned with this note's suggested solution, but the flawed negotiation process, lack of
transparency, and general disapproval of ACTA by members of both the rights holder and ISP
community suggest that ACTA will not be useful in fostering such cooperation.
IH.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS SHOULD CONTINUE TO
ENFORCE THE VIACOM COURT'S APPROACH

In order for an international copyright enforcement regime to be successful, it must
balance the interests of those in the copyright industry with individuals' rights to access and
engage copyright content. 18 ' However, the difficulty in finding this balance has been demonstrated by the fact that "no country has really achieved the fine balance of representing human
rights, culture and privacy concerns effectively and in such a way as to offer a suitable coun82
terweight to corporate interests."'
Despite arguments to the contrary from copyright holders and members of the media
and entertainment industry, the decision set forth by the Viacom court laid the foundation for
such a balanced copyright enforcement regime. In light of the relative ease with which a rights
holder can monitor the inappropriate use of its copyrighted material, compared to the proactive investigation required for the ISP to determine the same, the court correctly placed the
burden to police on the rights holder.
In fact, to keep the obligation placed on the ISPs at the "Notice and Take-Down"
level would stay in line with those objectives expressed by many in the content provider and
intermediary industries. 183 While placing additional legal obligations upon the ISPs would
result in additional litigation, on top of that which has already been pulling Google and other
ISPs into court, an express refusal to place such an obligation on the intermediaries would
better foster a sense of cooperation between the two industries. With the latter, YouTube can
continue to experiment with such tools like the successful "Content ID" tool, which has received praise from proponents both for and against the Viacom court's approach.184
Moreover, stakeholders from both sides of the debate have expressed extensive critiques regarding the ACTA negotiations and resulting text, demonstrating the difficulty in using
a multilateral trade agreement to successfully strike the balance between battling against
piracy and allowing for development and growth. 185 The extensive watering-down of the
ACTA provisions regarding ISP liability demonstrate that the desire to hold ISPs to a higher
standard of obligation with regards to screening out infringing works is helpful in theory but
180 Sean Flynn, ACTA's ConstitutionalProblem, PIJIP (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/
blog-post/acta-s-constitutional-problem#4.
181 See Woods, supra note 4, at 386-88.
182 Id. at 387 (quoting Mira Sundara Rajan, Copyright: Let's Take Ownership, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 2,
2009, http://www.globeandmail.com/news/opinions/copyright-lets-take-ownership/articlel238407/).
183See TECH. POL'Y INST. ASPEN FORUM, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
'84See id.

185See supra, notes 158-182, and accompanying text.
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unrealistic and detrimental in practice. 186 The extreme levels of criticism towards ACTA from
industry stakeholders and legal commentators illustrate that any such agreement must undergo
a more transparent and stringent approval process from legislators who are answerable to the
1 87
voting public of their sovereign countries.
Also noteworthy is the lack of success thus far to integrate new legislation that will
88
affirmatively obligate ISPs to take on additional duties to counteract counterfeit and piracy. 1
This activity only strengthens the argument that the approach taken by the court in Viacom
was the most balanced approach and will be most effective in integrating an international
copyright enforcement regime.
There has been a great deal of movement domestically as well as on the international
level suggesting that in the near future a more definite legislative measure will be carried out
to concretize the ISP's precise duty. With the rapid changes that occur in technology every
day, legislation regulating this area of communication must be carefully vetted and considered
before becoming binding on a domestic or international level.
Finally, there is a great deal of evidence, based on Google's recent actions, that the
corporation will continue to fortify its own foreign policy with respect to not only counterfeit
89
and piracy, but also additional issues like privacy and freedom of information. 1 In any case,
as Google and YouTube continue to emphasize, the developments to this point could not have
occurred without the same flexible legislation that has thus far enabled them to experiment
without fear of facing destructive litigation. The United States and foreign nations must maintain this flexibility to continue to encourage digital development and growth into the future.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Matt Lauer, host of NBC's "Today Show," recently asked, "Do you need proof that
life in this country can change overnight? Look no further than Ted Williams."' 9 ° Ted Williams, referred to as "The Man with the Golden Voice," was a homeless former drug addict,
panhandling along the side of the road in Columbus, Ohio. 19 1 He would hold up a sign that
said "he'd fallen on hard times but has a God-given gift of voice." 192 However, when a
reporter posted on YouTube a video of him using his "God-given gift of voice," Mr. Williams
shot to relative fame overnight. 193 Following in the steps of other "Internet sensations" like
Susan Boyle 19 4 and Justin Beiber, 195 Mr. Williams' video quickly garnered almost 3 million
186 Pegoraro, supra note 172.
187 See, e.g., Bentes, et. al, supra note 161.

188 Supra, notes 111-115, and accompanying text.
189 See Mark Landler, Google Searches for a Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/03/28/weekinreview/281andler.html. Google's corporate actions regarding privacy and
freedom of information are outside the scope of this Note.
190 Matt Toder, Golden-Voiced Ted Williams Announces Today Show Opening, GAWKER (Jan. 6, 2011,9:32

AM), http://gawker.com/5726480/golden6iced-ted-williams-announces-today-show-opening.
'9' Ted Williams, "Man with Golden Voice," Speaks, THE EARLY SHow, broadcast on CBS (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/01/05/earlyshow/main7215450.shtml [hereinafter Ted Williams, "Man
with Golden Voice," Speaks].
192 id.
193 Id.

194 See Associated Press, Susan Boyle is First Woman to Have No. I Album in UK and US at the Same Time
Twice

in One Year, N.Y. DAILY

NEWS (Nov.

18,

2010), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-11-18/

entertainment/270816641 susan-boyle-uk-album. Susan Boyle was the first woman to have a number one
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hits on YouTube. 196 Since his video's success on YouTube, many individuals, including
Oprah Winfrey, offered to employ Mr. Williams.1 97 Mr. Williams' story is significant because it demonstrates the power of the human spirit, but is also significant because it demonstrates YouTube's influence over the American public at large. YouTube's ability to have
such influence depends on the continuation of the flexible legislation that has thus far enabled
the site to connect billions of people within this country, and across the world, without fear of
incurring destructive litigation costs.

album in the U.S. as well as the U.K. at the same time twice in one year. She became a singing star after her
audition for a British television show was posted to YouTube and received more than 120 million views on the
site. Id.
195See Desiree Adib, Pop Star Justin Bieber Is on the Brink of Superstardom, GOOD MORNING AMERICA (Nov.
14, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Weekend/teen-pop-star-justin-bieber-discovered-youtube/story?id=906
8403. Recording artist Usher discovered Justin Bieber when the 12 year old posted videos to YouTube of
himself performing. He attained management after his videos started garnering tens of thousands of views.
Since being discovered, his success has continued off the Internet as well, as he's achieved hit records and
earned millions of dollars. Id.
196 Ted Williams, "Man with Golden Voice,"' Speaks, supra note 191.
197See Larry McShane & Aliyah Shahid, Oprah Comes Calling ForMan With Golden Voice Ted Williams as
Mom Offers Tough Love on 'Today' Show, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/national/2011/01/07/2011-01-07_ted williams-man-with-goldenvoice and motherreunite.on-today_
mom-says-dont.dis.html?r=news.
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